Geopolitical competition in cyberspace has made cyber defense a key component of national security. This study compares cyber defense policymaking in the European Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran to derive lessons for Iran. It examines similarities and differences in their policy documents and institutional structures and their implications for strengthening Iran’s cyber resilience and deterrence. The study uses a qualitative comparative approach and directed content analysis within a “most different systems” framework. Data from official documents, laws, and authoritative reports are analyzed through seven dimensions: command and coordination, deterrence, civil-military integration, technological localization, operational response, policy priorities, and political leadership. The findings indicate that the European Union follows a networked, multi-level model in which military authority rests with member states and the Union coordinates their efforts. China follows a centralized model, with cyber forces under the Central Military Commission and civilian activities linked to defense. In Iran, policymaking relies on high-level policy documents and emphasizes deterrence and technological localization. However, coordination responsibilities are distributed across several institutions, and recent crises reveal a gap between stated capabilities and implementation agility. The study proposes a context-specific hybrid model for Iran’s cyber defense policymaking by 2031, emphasizing clearer coordination authorities, a cyber defense doctrine, stronger civil-defense cooperation, and standardized national response mechanisms.