International sanctions in the FATF regime have evolved from mere punitive instruments to complex mechanisms for changing the behavior of states, but the effectiveness of this system faces structural challenges. This article aims to examine the mechanisms and performance of the FATF in enhancing the effectiveness of international sanctions. The central question is to what extent the performance of the FATF affects the effectiveness of international sanctions? This article argues that the gradual transformation of recommendations into legal requirements, accompanied by targeted incentives and punishments, enables the modification of state behavior. This research, using a qualitative analysis of the documents of the Financial Action Task Force, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (2012-2023) and a case study of Iran and Pakistan, has concluded that the existence of combined mechanisms (transforming the forty recommendations into binding laws through coordination with the IMF and the World Bank) and the use of punitive tools (blacklisting with consequences such as Iran's exclusion from SWIFT and a 40% increase in transaction costs) along with reform incentives have been able to increase the effectiveness of sanctions.